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SHOULD THE LAW IGNORE COMMERCIAL
NORMS? A COMMENT ON THE BERNSTEIN
CONJECTURE AND ITS RELEVANCE FOR
CONTRACT LAW THEORY AND REFORM
Jason Scott Johnston*

Professor Bernstein's study1 of the interaction between private law
and norms in the cotton industry is the latest installment in her
ongoing investigation into the relationship between law and norms in
trades ranging from the diamond market to grain and feed markets.
Her incredibly detailed and thorough exploration of private
lawmaking and commercial norms - and their interaction - stands as
one of the most significant contributions to contract and commercial
law scholarship made in the last half-century. The cotton industry
study upon which I focus in this Comment not only reports fascinating
findings about dispute resolution practices, but also presents a number
of intriguing and complementary theoretical insights into those
practices. Bernstein's empirical findings call into question some of the
fundamental results in the economic analysis of contract law, such as
the theory that expectation damages induce efficient breach of
contract. Her central induction from her discoveries about cotton
industry practices is that the best way for the law to encourage the
development of extralegal norms of commercial reasonableness and
the enforcement of those norms via commercial reputation may be,
paradoxically, to make those norms irrelevant in formal dispute
resolution. This hypothesis - which I dub the "Bernstein Conjecture"
- suggests that the underlying methodological supposition in Article
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code - that the law should mirror or
reflect actual commercial norms - may in fact be destructive of the
very norms it seeks to incorporate. This is no small implication. For
this reason, after beginning with a few methodological quibbles, the
bulk of this Comment focuses on the Bernstein Conjecture. I first
develop an informal but quite general analysis of the role of the law in
deterring commercial opportunism, and I then focus more precisely on
identifying the social and market context in which the Bernstein
Conjecture is likely to hold.
*
Robert G. Fuller, Jr. Professor of Law and Director, Program on Law and
Environment, University of Pennsylvania Law School. A.B. 1978, Dartmouth; J.D. 1981,
Ph.D. 1984, University of Michigan. - Ed.

1. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001).
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I.

METHODOLOGY AND SIGNIFICANCE

A.

A Peculiar, but Important, Empiricism

(Vol. 99:1791

Bernstein's paper is laudably ambitious. She explains the strategic
logic behind the cotton industry's mix of private lawmaking
institutions and nonlegal sanctions, and she theorizes about the lessons
that may be drawn from the cotton industry for commercial law more
generally. The paper nicely integrates theory with evidence. This
ambitious integration, however, also tends at times to obscure the
fascinating empirical questions and answers provided by Bernstein's
study. Regardless of whether one is persuaded that Bernstein has
really succeeded in explaining cotton industry practices, the empirical
evidence that she has uncovered about those practices has some very
important implications for contract law.
Before discussing the implications of Bernstein's findings, a brief
methodological digress ion is in order. Bernstein's empirical data is
primarily qualitative. It consists of recorded interviews with cotton
industry traders. (apparently done mostly over the telephone) and
arbitration case files. Her characterization of the data is likewise
qualitative. Sometimes this kind of characterization of the data is
inconsequential. For instance, she says that many years ago, prior
arbitration opinions were "sometimes" mentioned as guiding authority
but today are "r arely" mentioned. 2 Bernstein does not tell us precisely
what she means by "sometimes" and "rarely." The reader is left to
infer that these terms are being used in a relative sense, relative to the
frequency with which one might expect to see references to prior
opinions in the published j udici al decisions. The vague descriptors
"sometimes" and "rarely" do not cause any trouble for Bernstein here,
primarily because the role of precedent in cotton industry arbitration
is peripheral to Bernstein's main claims about arbitration's function in
the cotton industry.
More troublesome is her qualitative characterization of private law
adjudication in cotton arbitration proceedings. Bernstein repeatedly
characterizes as "formalistic" the reasoning in cotton arbitration
decisions.3 She claims that although parties' briefs "often make
arguments based on good faith . . . , notions of good faith and fairness
do not appear to affect case outcomes. "4 She says that even though
one set of formal trade rules (the Southern Mill Rules - "SMRs" that govern merchant-to-mill transactions) explicitly directs arbitrators

2. Id. at 1730 n.30.
3. See, e.g., id. at 1735, 1737-38.
4. Id. at 1734 & nn.51-53.
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to look to industry custom to fill gaps in contracts, "unlike
courts[,] . . . arbitrators are reluctant to find that gaps exist and they do
not permit custom to trump or vary trade rules or explicit contractual
provisions. "5 Another important set of formal trade rules (those of the
Memphis Cotton Exchange - "MCE" - governing contracts
between traders) is silent on the role of custom, but she says that
arbitrators in this system do not actually take custom into account, as
evidenced by the fact that custom is mentioned only three times in
MCE opinions over the 1944-1991 period. 6 Similarly, she finds custom
mentioned in only four of the forty-two B.A. opinions over the 19291951 petiod. 7 Bernstein in fact cites the ninety-one instances in which
cotton arbitrators apparently did attempt to craft split-the-difference,
compromise results because they felt that such a result was fair. 8 It is
difficult to judge the significance of these opinions, just as it is difficult
to assess her report that custom is infrequently mentioned in arbitral
opinions. The problem is that the comparison between the court
system and cotton industry arbitration is left unquantified: there is no
comparison between, for instance, the rate at which courts refer to
custom in cotton arbitration versus the rate in some sample of j udicial
opinions applying Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Yet Bernstein clearly means to contrast the way cotton arbitrators
decide cases under formal industry trade rules with the way in which
courts decide cases under the Uniform Commercial Code: cotton
industry arbitrators steadfastly and formalistically follow bright-line
trade rules, while courts applying Article 2 roam about through a
jungle of oral testimony about industry and relational norms on a
Quifotian search for commercial "reasonableness." These ·are very
important but also very broad qualitative characterizations. They are,
moreover, the sort of qualitative judgments· that define traditional,
doctrinal legal scholarship. With the proliferation in recent years of
"interdisciplinary" legal scholarship -'- law arid economics, law and
behavioral economics, law and norms, law and society, law and
history, law and critical theory, and so on - doctrinal scholarship has
fallen· rather out of fashion. Doctrinal scholarship is perceived by
many cutting-edge legal academics as sorely lacking in "rigor." In at
least one crucial way, however, doctrinal analysis is really very
scientific. Because they are interested mostly in persuading the reader
that a particular recent opinion was sensible or foolish and ought to
have .limited or vast precedential effect, doctrinal scholars usually find
it necessary to talk about judicial opinions at great length. Even in the

5. Id. at 1736.
6. Id. at 1736.
7. Id. at 1736 n.63.
8. Id. at 1734 n.52.
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text of their articles, they really get into the guts of opinions, often
quoting long passages. At the end (or even before the end if the
reader does not have the stamina to get that far), the reader is in a
pretty good position to assess the strength of the author's interpretive
characterization.
Without getting into hermeneutic fine points, one can see how
conventional doctrinal scholarship facilitates interpretive critique and
thus enables a kind of qualitative verification process. One wishes that
Bernstein's description of cotton industry disputing practices were
equally amenable to critique. As it is, the reader does not really have :a
baseline - qualitative or quantitative - against which to assess her
claims regarding ·the empirical superiority of the cotton industry's
private law system to the Article 2 public law system.
There is, of course, the obvious functionalist argument that
because cotton industry participants continue to use their own private
law system rather than public legal system, they must find it superior.
Below, I shall have more to say about the validity and implications of
this kind of survival-of-the-fittest line of reasoning about alternative
legal systems. 9 My present point is that Bernstein's methodology - an
essentially qualitative analysis of case file and interview data - does
not permit empirical evaluation of the relative efficiency of alternative
dispute resolution systems. She presents data on the infrequency of
arbitrated disputes in the cotton industry from which one ··can
reasonably conclude, as she does, that the vast majority of disputes in
that industry are resolved informally. But the vast majority ·of
commercial contract disputes are also resolved informally and without
litigation in the public legal system. Without some sense of contract
dispute resolution in those industries that for whatever reason do not
have their own private legal system, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
draw comparative lessons from Bernstein's findings.
Bernstein's study is tremendously valuable, not for comparative
purposes, but in revealing features of the cotton industry's private law
system that neither standard doctrinal nor quantitative empirical work
could uncover. Formal cotton industry trade rules are silent about the
implied duty of good faith10 and make course of performance and
course of dealing between contracting parties irrelevant to an
arbitrator's determination of their intentions.11 The industry has
adopted a simple and inflexible measure of damages given by the
difference between contract and market price plus a one-half cent per
pound penalty.12 Failure to comply with an arbitral award is grounds

9. See Part III infra.
10. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 1734 & nn.51-54.
11. Id. at 1735 & n.58.
12. Id. at 1733.

June 2001]

Comment on Bernstein

1795

for expulsion from cotton shippers' associations and from the Cotton
Exchange.13 Membership in the association of cotton mills, however, is
not affected by a mill's failure to comply with an award.
As for the significance of reputation within the cotton industry,
Bernstein recounts a number of conversations with both growers and
mill owners to the effect that reputation is "essential" to transacting
within the industry. 14 Mill owners - cotton buyers - reported that
because the quality of cotton is so "subtle and subjective," and yet
they often make deals over the phone without physical inspection of
the goods, it is crucial that the buyer know about the seller and be able
to rely on his word regarding quality.15 A cotton market participant's
commercial reputation depends on whether he has performed as
promised (has the mill promptly accepted delivery? has the merchant
delivered the promised quality of goods on time?), as well as on his
willingness to be flexible in the face of changing circumstances, even
to the point of being willing to renegotiate key terms of the deal.16
Reputation must be verifiably communicated to be valuable. Such
information transmission was a simple social fact in the rural, small
town south in which the industry arose, where mill owners were town
leaders, and where the members of the Memphis Cotton Exchange
saw each other daily and "viewed themselves as being part of the same
club."17 One of Bernstein's most interesting and important discoveries
is the deliberate production in recent years of more formal institutions
for transmitting information about industry norms and individual
reputations for complying with those norms. An eight-week summer
Cotton Institute instructs new merchants in the content of the trading
rules. Although norm violations are not formally determinative of
arbitrators' decisions, (some) arbitration opinions are circulated
within the industry, and these often include what Bernstein describes
as "preachy statements about what is and what is not acceptable
business behavior."18 Independent private publications as well as trade
association circulars now rate the financial responsibility of cotton
shippers and buyers.19

13. Id. at 1737.
14. Id. at 1746.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1744.
17. Id. at 1750.
18. Id. at 1773.
19. Id. at 1753.
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B.· Law's Role in Contract Breach and Renegotiation:
The Bernstein Conjecture

Bernstein's findings about cotton industry dispute resolution
practices alone carry some important lessons for contract law and
theory. Perhaps most important is what Bernstein's conversations
revealed about the way cotton industry participants understand
contract breach. Bernstein's respondents clearly repudiated the notion
that they were indifferent between getting damages for breach and
receiving promised performance.20 The respondents also provided an
explanation for their unwillingness to accept breach and payment of
damages as a substitute for performance: from a cotton mill's point of
view, the reason for purchasing cotton forward, rather than on spot
markets, is to ensure continuity and provide certainty. Similarly,
cotton merchants shift risk from growers to themselves, but the risk to
merchants themselves would be intolerable were they not able to shift
risk downstream to mills.21 For both merchants and mills, breach
destroys the fundamental reason for contracting. Or, more accurately
in terms of Bernstein's findings, while a single breach caused by
unusual circumstances may be forgiven, a pattern of breach by a
particular merchant or mill will not be forgotten. Such a pattern not
only makes it foolish for the immediate victim to trust the breaching
party again, but other market participants will learn of the pattern,
and they, too, will avoid dealing with the offending party. Bernstein
has discovered that, in the cotton industry, the legal damage measure
is in a certain sense irrelevant. No matter what the damage measure
might be, it simply cannot replace performance.
This is not to say that the formal cotton industry trade rules simply
dispense with damages for breach. Rather, as Bernstein explains in
some detail, because of the complexity and cost of getting expectancy
based damages, cotton industry trade rules provide a very simple, low
cost damage measure - the difference between contract and market
price plus a fixed per-pound penalty.22 Especially given the low-cost,
streamlined procedures in cotton industry arbitration, these market
difference damages would appear to do a relatively good job of
compensating for and deterring breach motivated solely by big swings
in market price. But no measure of damages can really compensate a
trader for dealing with someone with a known propensity to find lots
of reasons, whether real or concocted, for degrading performance (by,
for example, delivering late or poor quality goods, or by refusing to

20. Id. at 1750.
21. Id. at 1776.
22. Id. at 1756.
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accept goods without a discount). Hence, it is not legal but extralegal
sanctions that deter such patterned opportunism. 23
This is an exceptionally important empirical finding. The economic
analysis of contract law begins (both historically and often
analytically) from the demonstration that perfectly compensatory
expectation-based contract damages create an incentive for efficient
breach - breach when performance would generate lower net value
than some alternative performance (including not performing at all, as
when performance cost rises dramatically). 24 Bernstein's study reveals
that it is precisely in those markets where forward contracts are most
important - volatile commodity markets - that efficient breach
approaches utter nonsense. On such markets, the point of having a
contract is to reduce uncertainty and guard against unanticipated
market price changes. Were every such price change to trigger breach
on one side of the market or the other (depending upon the direction
of the market-price change), the market would literally disintegrate.
However efficient the market's formal dispute resolution mechanism
- and Bernstein presents plenty of evidence that the cotton industry's
is highly efficient - such markets simply cannot wait for the
consequences of breach to be remedied. They must not occur in the
first place.
The fact that sophisticated cotton traders regard contract breach as
a violation of industry norms should cause law and economics scholars
to rethink seriously the relevance of the efficient breach model. Some
of Bernstein's other findings make one doubt that law - whether
public or private - matters much at all in industries like cotton that
have strong systems of nonlegal sanctions. Bernstein reports that news
of the outcomes of most arbitrated disputes between merchants
quickly reaches other merchants, and that opinions of the Board of
Appeals ("BoA") (deciding disputes between mills and merchants)
are actually sent to all members of mill associations.25 Even though the
trade rules do not impose an explicit good faith requirement,
arbitrators' opinions apparently quite often comment explicitly upon
the commercial acceptability of the parties' behavior.26 Given that
arbitration results and opinions are quite widely disseminated within
the industry, Bernstein is certainly correct in thinking that a party's
reputation could suffer from the explicit condemnation of an
experienced and knowledgeable arbitrator.27
23. Id. at 1755-85.
24. For the classic analysis, see Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated
Damages, Penalties, and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement
Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977).
25. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 1730.
26. Id. at 1734 nn.52-54.
27. Id. at 1768-69.
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But even. granting that arbitrators often include lots of very
judgmental stuff in their opinions, stuff highly relevant to commercial
reputation, it is hard to see how those opinions could in fact play an
important role in reputation formation. First, not all opinions are
available to nonparties. Bernstein does not explain why opinions
handed down by the MCE (resolving disputes between merchants) are
not made public,28 while those decided by the BoA are actually sent to
all members of the largest mill associations.29 Second, there are very
few cotton industry arbitrations at all - and even fewer where both
parties are actually staying in business. Apparently the MCE and BoA
each averaged about two arbitrations per year over Bernstein's study
period,30 while there were only twenty-eight merchant-mill disputes
brought before the BoA over the twenty-one-year period 1975-1996.31
Although Bernstein oddly does not provide this data, one suspects
that a large fraction of arbitrations involves end-game situations,
where, because of bankruptcy or death, the defendant is going out of
business.32 Bernstein's findings suggest that arbitration under the
formal trade rules does not play a very large direct role in reputation
formation.33
This is in fact consistent with Bernstein's own interpretation of the
cotton industry interviews. She stresses that the primary significance
of private law for the parallel world of commercial norms and nonlegal
sanctions is not direct but rather indirect.34 What is crucial about the
cotton industry trade rules is their form: they provide a background of
clear, bright-line performance obligations against which cotton traders
bargain to resolve disputes and overcome unforeseen contingencies.
Cotton traders have an incentive to behave reasonably not because
formal cotton trade rules explicitly tell them to do so, but because if
they don't, they will acquire reputations for opportunism and face
fewer or less valuable trading opportunities in the future. Were the
law to attempt to mirror commercial norms of reasonableness by
requiring reasonableness, Bernstein concludes, it would severely
hinder the process by which reputation develops and tend to destroy
the system of nonlegal sanctions.
This in my view is Bernstein's central hypothesis. It is a brilliant
and fascinating conjecture. If true of markets in general - rather than

28. Id. at 1.730.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1762.
31. Id. at 1728 n.18.
32. Id. at 1738-40 & nn.71-74.
33. This conclusion is reinforced by Bernstein's finding that the parties' names are
redacted from the formal opinions.
34. Bernstein, supra note 1, at Sections 111.3-III.4.
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only those that bear structural similarities to the cotton trade - it
would have powerful implications for public law reform. Its truth,
however, is not at all obvious. For Bernstein's is a conjecture about
how legal form - the choice between the cotton trade's bright-line
obligations and the UCC's open-textured standards - affects the
evolution and maintenance of commercial norms and nonlegal
sanctions for their violation. As I explain below, the relationship
between legal form and the evolution of commercial norms is
complex, depending upon market and social structures that are
historically contingent and highly contextual. Before exploring her
conjecture further, one must first clarify more generally the
relationship between legal and extralegal sanctions.
II.

LAW, NORMS, AND CONTRACfUAL OPPORTUNISM

Perhaps the fundamental contribution of the Chicago school to the
study of contract law is the insight that when courts take an open
textured approach and make contract obligations depend upon
"reasonable" or "good faith" behavior, they remain imperfect.35 True,
courts will often correctly identify and sanction bad faith behavior,
cutting both the cost (to the victim) and the benefit (to the
perpetrator) of contractual opportunism, but they sometimes miss
instances of bad faith, and they sometimes mistakenly conclude that a
party has acted in bad faith when all it has done is exercise a clear
contractual right. The victim of such a judicial error ends up
uncompensated or must pay damages even though it did not in fact
engage in bad faith. Such a damage award encourages opportunistic
actors to make unfounded claims that the other party acted in bad
faith. False positives thus increase both the cost (to the victim) and
benefit (to the perpetrator) of contractual opportunism.
If the risk of false judicial determinations of bad faith is sufficiently
low, then a legally enforceable duty of good faith and reasonable
behavior may actually improve market efficiency. It may do so by
lowering the barrier to entry created by established reputation. As
Bernstein shows, especially when contract performance involves a
significant subjective component and varies greatly across alternative
contracting partners, market participants have a very strong incentive
to learn about the quality of alternative contracting partners and to
stick with those who establish a reputation for quality, fair dealing,
and flexibility in the face of unforeseen circumstances. They are
hesitant to take a chance with a new entrant to the market whose
reputation cannot be ascertained. If enforced with sufficient accuracy,

35. Articles that elegantly set forth this insight include Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel
R. Fischel, Close Corporations and Agency Costs, 38 STAN. L. R EV. 271 (1986), and Richard
A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1989).

1800

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:1791

legal sanctions for bad faith behavior lessen the risk of going with such
a new entrant, thus encouraging entry and helping to make markets
more competitive.36
As a theoretical matter, therefore, judicial policing of contractual
opportunism is likely to improve market efficiency only when courts
narrow the forms of sanctionable opportunism to those that they can
identify accurately. It is highly unlikely that courts can identify
instances of "opportunism" premised solely upon the failure of one of
the parties to comply with a relationship-specific norm of good faith
that is based not upon trade customs but upon the peculiarities of the
particular parties. Thus, Bernstein's finding37 that course of dealing
and performance are given no weight in cotton arbitrations has
general significance. Arbitrators are no more informed regarding truly
relationship-specific norms than are courts. Neither arbitrators nor
courts can verify relationship-specific norms with sufficient accuracy
to make it efficient to incorporate such norms into the law.
Bernstein's findings reveal the exclusion from cotton arbitrations
even of those norms that are customary within the trade and that
arbitrators, who are themselves experts in the trade, are therefore
likely to know and understand. Inasmuch as violations of many of
these norms would be verifiable instances of opportunism, what I have
said thus far would seem to imply that cotton arbitration may be
inefficiently ignoring customary norms. This is unlikely to be the case.
The reason is that my analysis has only focused on private legal
sanctions as a complement to nonlegal sanctions. Legal sanctions for
verifiable instances of opportunism can effectively lessen the risk of
dealing with a new entrant who has not yet acquired a reputation. But
they also impact the process by which reputation is formed.
Paradoxically, it may be much easier for parties to generate good
reputations when the law does not require "good faith" behavior than
when it does.
A formal demonstration of this claim is beyond the scope of this
Comment,38 but to understand the intuition behind it, consider the
following simple example. Suppqse that by behaving opportunistically
and claiming that a particular delivery of cotton is inferior when it is
not, a cotton mill might gain $100 above what it expected under the
contract. If the rules applied in arbitration made such conduct
36. Legal sanctions are only effective against defendants with sufficient wealth to pay
the expected judgment, but unlike reputation, information about a newcomer's balance
sheet can be acquired with relative accuracy and at relatively low cost.
37. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 1735 & n.58.
38. The driving idea here is that if a party complies only because it is legally obligated to
do so, then its reputation is not enhanced; the legal discretion to act in "bad faith" may be
what makes good faith behavior a credible indicator that the party is cooperative. See
Arnoud W.A. Boot et al., Reputation and Discretion in Financial Contracting, 83. AM. ECON.
REV. 1165 (1993).
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actionable as breach,. and such conduct were verifiable with a high
degree of accuracy, then the merchant could credibly threaten to sue
over such opportunism and thereby deprive the mill of the. $100 gain
from opportunism. Under such circumstances, . any particular mill's
reasonable behavior would do nothing toward establishing the mill's
reputation. The reason is that even if the merchant and mill were
never going to see each other again, so that the game - the merchant
mill transaction - were not going to be repeated, the mill's dominant
strategy would be to eschew opportunism. If the law is so effective that
it.deters even bad types from cheating, then failure to cheat does not
reveal anything about a party's propensity to cheat.
The paradox is that in order to facilitate reputation formation, the
law must allow some instances of verifiable cheating to go without
legal sanction. This is not to say that the ideal regime would impose no
legal sanctions for verifiable cheating. Ideally, the law would ignore all
but the most grievous and dangerous forms of verifiable opportunism.
By leaving minor instances of opportunism unsanctioned, the law sets
up a game in which actors who have a high payoff from opportunism
will reveal themselves by taking the opportunity. Bernstein's work
shows that a history of cheating gets around very quickly in the cotton
industry, triggering the two primary nonlegal sanctions: refusalto deal
and refusal to cooperate.
That such nonlegal sanctions exist and are applied does not show
that they effectively deter all cheating. By repeatedly cheating, a party
reveals that it is relatively immune to the nonlegal sanctions of
retaliatory cheating and boycott. The paradigmatic instance of such
immunity is a monopolist: because the monopolist gets high rents, it
can survive many rounds of retaliatory cheating . with relative
impunity, and because it is a monopolist, there is nowhere else for
buyers to go.
Bernstein provides hints here and there that cotton mills may
generally have a stronger bargaining position than merchants.39 Still,
Bernstein's description of the cotton industry suggests that the
industry is far from being either a monopoly or a monopsony. But it is
equally clear from her discussion that the cotton industry· departs
radically from the textbook description of perfect competition. Cotton
merchants and mills appear to have highly individualized reputations.
Her conversations reveal that sometimes a merchant or mill simply
has to live with obvious and verifiable instances of opportunism. For
this to be so, it must be that the market is not sufficiently thick for a
single instance of opportunism to cause the cheater's elimination from
the market. What Bernstein seems to have found is an equilibrium in
39. In an earlier version, Bernstein stated that there are "far fewer mills than
merchants"; id. at 1747 (observing that most merchants operate on "very slim" cash flow
margins).
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which the market tolerates low levels of cheating, at least on the part
of some powerful market participants. This should not be surprising,
for on this view the strategic reason why the cotton industry's private
law regime ignores some instances of low-level opportunism is
precisely in order to create an opportunity for cheating to occur.
It is important, however, that the private law regime not ignore the
most serious and potentially damaging instances of verifiable
opportunism. This is true on both the cost (victim's) and benefit
(cheater's) side. As Bernstein notes, even the most severe extralegal
sanctions - ostracism and exclusion from the industry, a virtual
commercial death sentence - are ineffective against a participant who
is leaving the industry anyway. What she calls the end-game
participants - those on the verge of bankruptcy, or family firms
whose controlling member has died without an obvious successor are immune to the ultimate extralegal sanctions of industry ostracism.
These sanctions do not deny the benefits of opportunism to end-game
actors. On the victim's side, the problem with extralegal sanctions especially third-party refusals to deal in the future - is that they do
not do anything to compensate the victim for her losses from
opportunism. If there were no opportunity to get legal damages even
for the most harmful instances of opportunism, then market
participants would face enormous risk when dealing with firms that
are undergoing difficulties and may be tempted by end-game
opportunism.
III. IS FORMALISM RIGHT FOR EVERYBODY?
BERNSTEIN AND PUBLIC LAW REFORM

There can be little doubt that Bernstein's work has generated
interesting and important insights into private lawmaking and the
interaction between legal (albeit private legal) sanctions and nonlegal
sanctions. She clearly believes,40 however, that her findings have
implications beyond the world of closely knit merchant communities
such as the diamond and cotton trades, and implications for public law
reform. Granted that Bernstein has established that the private law of
the cotton industry does not attempt to mirror the norms that govern
work-a-day business relations, does this then establish that Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code rests on a fundamentally mistaken
philosophy? Karl Llewellyn believed that by making decisions turn on
arcane and formalistic determinations such as the location of title, the
law of sales had gone badly awry. In drafting Article 2, he pursued the
principle that the law of sales should as much as possible simply reflect
40. See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's
Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (1996) (arguing that her
findings on private legal systems cast doubt on Article 2's incorporation strategy).
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commercially reasonable practice.41 The Article 2 provisions that
Bernstein marks as deviating most dramatically from the private law
of the cotton trade - such as the priority given to course of
performance and course of dealing in determining the parties'
contractual obligations, and the general implied obligation of
commercially reasonable conduct (the objective good faith obligation)
- are prime instances of Article 2's general "Reflection" philosophy.
The question is whether Bernstein is correct in thinking that the
dramatic distinction between Article 2's open-textured reflection
strategy and the apparently formalistic approach taken by the private
law system in the cotton trade means that Article 2 ought to be
reformed. Another way of putting this question is simply to ask: were
the formalists correct? Are seemingly arbitrary and imperfect bright
line legal rules superior to the highly fact-specific effort to make the
law mirror commercial norms?
A.

Why Social and Market Structure Matter

The analysis from the previous section strongly supports
Bernstein's critique of the Code's automatic absorption into a
commercial contract of concessions and other adjustments made in the
course of dealing or course of performance. Even if the parties
intended for such concessions to in fact modify their future
obligations, there is much too high a probability that courts will err in
determining what the parties have actually done or said in their prior
dealings. This high probability of error makes it too easy for a party
who failed to get a particular term in the contract to insist afterward
that although the contract does not say a thing about it, the term in
fact was there, implied by prior dealings or performance.42 Thus,
course of dealing and course of performance do more to encourage
opportunism than to prevent it. They discourage the very behavior
that Article 2 as a whole means to encourage. As Bernstein argues, a
merchant who reasonably agrees to renegotiate, or make other
"forgiving adjustments" must worry that those reasonable adjustments
will harden into fixed contractual obligations by virtue of the Code's

41. See Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn's
Attempt to Achieve The Good, The True, The Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J.
1141, 1164 (1985); Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the
Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 471 (1987).
42. For a very famous instance of this, see Trident Center v. Connecticut General Life
Insurance Co., 847 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1988) (where borrower argued for a contractual
prepayment right on basis of specious ambiguity).
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incorporation of course of performance and ·course of dealing as
implied contract terms.43
This criticism of Article 2 does not, however, imply that the cotton
industry's formalistic approach is correct for every industry. The
choice of a formalistic private law by cotton industry participants may
indicate its efficiency for that industry and hence the efficiency of a
similarly formalistic approach for identical industries. The problem, of
course, is that if an industry is really identical to the cotton industry in
all economically relevant respects, then one ought to observe that
industry participants have already contracted out of the public law
system by adopting their own private law system. The failure to
observe such a private law system is evidence either that an industry is
not as similar to cotton as it might at first seem, or that important
noneconomic factors account for the emergence of effective private
law institutions. Both possibilities may severely limit the relevance of
Bernstein's findings for general law reform.
Consider first the significance of an industry's social context.
Bernstein's own work demonstrates the power of noneconomic factors
in the evolution of systems of nonlegal commercial sanctions. Both the
diamond and cotton trades she has studied in detail were historically
very much closed worlds, with market participation limited to
individuals from particular religious, ethnic, and/or family groups.44
Group membership can be an extremely effective entry barrier. These
entry barriers generate economic rents - supracompetitive profits.
Such profits make the threat of expulsion from the industry
enormously powerful. Provided that the market is relatively
unconcentrated (given the ethno-religious constraint on participation),
no participant is so crucial as to be beyond the threat of explusion, at
least for sufficiently serious violations of industry norms.
That a requirement of ethnic group membership for participation
in a particular trade can create an effective entry barrier does not
explain how such trading communities arise in the first place. There is,
however, abundant historical evidence for the following account.45
43. Section 2-202 of the U.C.C. explicitly endorses the use of course of dealing or usage
of trade, see U.C.C. § 1-205, or course of performance, see U.C.C. § 2-208, to interpret the
parties' contractual obligations.
44. In addition to Bernstein, supra note 1, see Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal
System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115
(1992) [hereinafter Bernstein, Opting Out]. Although not emphasized by Bernstein, see id.,
the New York Diamond Dealers Club evolved in precisely such a social and cultural context.
See ALBERT LUBIN, DIAMOND DEALERS CLUB: A FIFfY-YEAR HISTORY (1982).

45. See JANET T. LANDA, TRUST, ETHNICITY AND IDENTITY: BEYOND THE NEW
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF ETHNIC TRADING, NETWORKS, CONTRACT LAW AND
G!Ff-EXCHANGE (1994) (surveying rules of ethnic market intermediation groups);
Bernstein, Opting Out, supra note 44; Avner Grief, Contract Enforceability and Economic
Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 525 (1993)
(discussing rise of Maghribi Coalition in international trade).
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Suppose that some small number of individuals begin to engage in
trade in some commodity. Unsure of the reliability of nonlocal legal
institutions, but desirous of expanding the geographic scope of trade,
the traders have a very strong interest in minimizing the occurrence of
disputes. They prefer to deal, either as agents or as contracting
partners, with family members or other individuals of the same ethnic
or religious group, because nonlegal sanctions are all that they have.
The ultimate nonlegal (but still lawful) sanction is expulsion. Before
any particular ethnic or religious group has come to dominate a trade,
the threat of expulsion from the trade is weak - group members do
not earn especially high rents, and even after expulsion from the
group, an individual can still engage in the trade. What makes
expulsion from the group effective at this early stage is that the group
is not just a trading group, but also a social and religious community.
For a believer, expulsion from a religious community may be worse
than death. Insofar as human beings are social animals, social
ostracism is always costly, and it is most costly at the extremes.
Exclusion from a group that is itself discriminated against casts the
outcast, provided she is identifiable, into the hell of isolated prejudice.
Exclusion from a group that dominates society imposes tremendous
indirect economic costs. The more fractured the society, the greater
the cost of social exclusion. At the extreme, where society is just a
collection of antagonistic groups competing over limited resources,
expulsion may have severe consequences. 4 6
Thus, before a n ethnic o r religious group has established
dominance in a particular field of commerce, the noneconomic costs of
group expulsion must be high for group expulsion to deter commercial
opportunism effectively. This gives close-knit ethnic and religious
groups a very large initial advantage in conducting trade. Over time,
this advantage may be so great that such groups establish dominance
within various lines of commerce.47 In this way, group membership
becomes a prerequisite to market participation. Group dominance of
the trade makes the economic costs of expulsion even greater than the
noneconomic social and religious costs. As economic sanctions

46. For evidence on· ostracism as a technique of social control, and its harsh effects, in
such an unforgiving environment, see RICHARD B. LEE, THE !KUNG SAN: MEN, WOMEN,
AND WORK IN A FORAGING SOCIETY (1979).
47. When a group that begins to gain dominance in a lucrative trade has traditionally
been discriminated against and is a political minority, dominant groups will react by
attempting to legislate or otherwise gain control over the trade. From Jewish bankers in
Europe to Chinese traders in South Asia, however, history shows that by the time such
reaction begins, the once downcast group will often have acquired sufficient wealth and
power to maintain and even enhance its economic and social position and rebuff the most
costly reactionary action. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND
THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 93 (1995) (discussing the success of Chinese merchant
families in maintaining authority); LUCIAN w. PYE, ASIAN POWER AND POLITICS: THE
CULTURAL DIMENSION OF AUTHORITY (1985).
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become primary, ethnic and religious affiliation tends to lose its
significance for sanctions and to become important primarily by
ensuring that information regarding opportunistic commercial
behavior is quickly and accurately communicated to other market
participants.
This account predicts one of Bernstein's most interesting empirical
findings, that as both the insularity and local power of southern elites
has diminished, the cotton trader and mill associations have found it
necessary to manufacture their own institutions to replace the
information-gathering and norm-communication functions previously
provided by organic social and religious groups. 48 It also casts doubt,
however, on her explanation of the differences between cotton and
other commodities, such as grain. Bernstein maintains that cotton is
special in that the quality of a particular lot of cotton is much more
variable and subjective than, for instance, grain.4 9 This makes it sound
as if grain comes off the field in standardized, clearly differentiated
grades that can be objectively determined. Yet as demonstrated by
environmental historian William Cronon, there is nothing natural
about the classification of grain and feed into standard grades.50 As he
recounts, prior to the advent of the railroad, grain was taken to market
in sacks, and the contents of each sack "remained intact, unmixed with
grain from other farms. Nothing adulterated the characteristic weight,
bulk, cleanliness, purity, and flavor that marked it as the product of a
particular tract of land and a particular farmer's labor. "51 The railroad
changed all this: by rerouting settlement away from river valleys and
toward railroad corridors, the railroad led to huge increases in both
demand and supply. Even more crucially, by mixing hundreds of
bushels of grain together in a single boxcar and then literally pouring
it out into enormous grain elevators, the railroad severed the
relationship between an individual producer and his product.52 The
individual grower now had an incentive to adulterate his own grain,
mixing wheat with lower-cost materials such as rye and chaff to
increase its weight, and thus its value, at elevator sales. It was to
overcome this incentive that the Chicago Board of Trade imposed
standardized grades.53 The existence of reliable grades was moreover a
direct consequence of the fact that the Board was equally balanced
between buyers and sellers. 54 Wheat and other grains are the
48. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 1752-54.
49. See id at 1745-46.
50. WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE'S METROPOLIS: CHICAGO AND THE GREAT WEST
107-20 (1991).
.

51. Id. at 107.
52. Id. at 109-19.
53. Id.
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economists' paradigm for a homogeneous good, but they are
homogeneous only because technological revolutions in grain
transportation and storage made standardized grades economically
imperative, not because they are naturally uniform.
The history of grain standardization strongly cautions that an
industry's or trade's economic structure is crucial in determining the
relationship between the legal and extralegal worlds. Bernstein's
investigations into the cotton and diamond trades are fascinating and
valuable in large part because these are very unusual markets. They
exemplify trades in which a relatively small and closely knit social
group gained dominance, precisely the sort of trade in which one
would expect extralegal norms to flourish. But as I argued above, the
very success of such a group weakens the importance of its ethnic or
religious affiliation. Gradually it is the prospect of losing the
opportunity to make supracompetitive profits, rather than social
ostracism, that becomes the strongest deterrent to opportunism. As
Bernstein's cotton study shows, as the social group lessens in
importance, market participants find it necessary to invest and
produce substitute institutions that facilitate the formation and
transmission of reputation; those created institutions, however, further
weaken the functional value of ethnic and religious affiliation. As the
historical evolution of the grain industry shows, once the number of
market participants grows sufficiently large, individualized product or
service reputation tends to vanish and standardized product grading
replaces it.
B.

The Limited Lessons of Private Law for Article 2 Law Reform

Much of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code aims to
supply default terms for commercial dealings on highly competitive
markets for standardized products. It is very difficult for nonlegal
sanctions to develop into a significant force against opportunism on
such markets. To see why, suppose heroically that there exists some
way of ensuring that none of the many market participants would deal
with an identified opportunist in the future. Even then, exclusion from
a competitive market costs the opportunist only the competitive rate
of return.ss Provided that there are sufficiently many such competitive
markets with relatively low costs of entry, a cheater can simply

54. Id. at 119.
55. This result might seem to contradict the oft-cited result in Benjamin Klein & Keith
B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL.
ECON. 615 (1981), that competition itself disciplines against opportunism. Their result,
however, depends upon the assumption that sellers compete in a monopolistically
competitive market with distinctly identifiable, branded products. Even more importantly,
they do not consider multimarket settings in which opportunists can move from market to
market.
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continue to rove from market to market. Because it is easy to enter
other markets, the primary nonlegal sanction of exclusion loses its
bite. In such a world - the economist's ideal of many highly
competitive markets - the equilibrium must be one in which there is
a positive amount of opportunism in all markets.5 6 Most importantly,
even when feasible (that is, even when information about cheating
does get communicated widely and cheaters can actually be
identified), nonlegal sanctions have no effect on the equilibrium level
of cheating.
This assumes that it is somehow possible to exclude an
opportunistic buyer or seller from a perfectly competitive market. But
perfect competition requires a very large number of buyers and sellers.
And as the number of market participants increases, so too does the
cost of communicating information regarding past instances of
opportunism. Nor can other market participants easily observe
"opportunism" directly. What Ellickson calls "third party" sanctions57
(that is, future refusals to deal by market participants other than the
person harmed by a particular instance of opportunism) are therefore
often triggered by reported rather than observed instances of
opportunism. As the number of market participants increases,
however, it becomes increasingly less likely that any given recipient of
a report of opportunism is professionally acquainted with the reporter
and believes that the report can be trusted. Without reliable reports of
opportunism, the third-party sanctioning system cannot work. And
second-party sanctions - a refusal by the victim to deal again with the
opportunist - are a very weak sanction indeed on thick, competitive
markets, where there are many fungible contracting opportunities.
When there are competing markets, participants in any particular
competitive market do of course have a direct interest in keeping the
level of opportunism relatively low so as not to drive away potential
customers. But extralegal sanctions do not do the job for them. This is
clearly illustrated by American stock markets, which engage in
organized and formal self-regulation as a means of policing
opportunism.5 8
There i s n o reason t o tailor legal rules to facilitate reputation
formation when market structure does not allow for reputation
formation. In a world with many highly competitive markets across
which participants move easily and with relative anonymity, nonlegal
·

56. With the equilibrium frequency of opportunism given credible expulsion determined
by the condition that the return to opportunism net the cost of entering a new market after
expulsion is equal to the return from staying in the original market but refraining from
opportunism.
57. ROBERT c. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 128 (1991).
58. See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453 (1997).
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sanctions are weak and/or ineffective. In such markets, the argument
for bright-line rules - that they facilitate the evolution of reputation
based extralegal sanctions - does not apply. Hence in such markets
there is good reason for the law to be more activist in attempting to
discern and police contractual opportunism. To the extent such
activism is enabled by Article 2's open-textured standards, those
standards are economically justified.
This is not to endorse every open-textured standard found in
Article 2. It is crucial to stress that even in such markets, it remains
true that false positives - false findings of opportunism - can
convert legal rules designed to deter opportunism into instruments of
opportunism. Hence, on competitive markets, it is appropriate for
legal rules to attempt to mirror and require reasonable commercial
behavior, but only those sorts of such reasonable behavior that can be
verified accurately by courts. Inasmuch as Article 2 defaults to the
market to determine what is "reasonable," it conforms to this
prescription. Insofar as Article 2 endorses the search for course of
performance and course of dealing, however, it becomes an
instrument for rather than a tool against contractual opportunism.
Article 2 applies equally to the polar situation of a highly
customized contract between a buyer and seller with market power.
As Bernstein's work demonstrates, participants in such markets
quickly acquire reputations, and the market structure is such that
information about a particular actor's behavior may be communicated
quickly and credibly to a large fraction of the market population. The
problem is that if an actor has too much market power, then nonlegal
sanctions against that actor may lose their credibility and
effectiveness. If, for instance, there is a monopoly in the production of
a good that is a vital downstream input, then refusing to deal with the
monopolist is not likely to be a credible sanction for its opportunistic
behavior. The ultimate social goal is to make such markets more
competitive. Increased competition brings not only the standard
benefits of lower prices and expanded output, but also gives buyers a
credible threat to discipline opportunism by refusing to deal again
with opportunistic suppliers. In theory, by disciplining contractual
opportunism, the law can lessen the risk of dealing with new, unknown
suppliers and thereby play an important role in facilitating entry into
such markets. In practice, the absence of commercial norms in the
initially monopolized market may limit quite severely a court's ability
to discern and enforce transitional norms. Still, even a very limited
judicial role in policing the most egregious and general forms of
opportunism (instances approaching fraud, for instance) can play a
socially valuable role by encouraging buyers to deal with new
suppliers.
I thus believe that there are very strong theoretical reasons for
thinking that the typical transactional dispute litigated under Article 2
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of the Uniform Commercial Code emerges from a market and social
structure that little resembles the world of the cotton industry
explicated by Bernstein. At the present, however, this is merely a
theoretical conjecture. Even if true, it does not detract from the
enormous value of Bernstein's work. By getting the evidence first, and
then developing a theoretical explanation, Bernstein's study not only
advances our knowledge of private commercial lawmaking
institutions, but provides a model for empirical legal scholarship more
generally.

